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Abstract 
An ad hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not need to rely on a predefined 
infrastructure to keep the network connected. Nodes communicate amongst each other 
using wireless radios and operate by following a peer-to-peer network model. In this 
article we investigate authentication in a layered approach, which results to multiple 
lines of defense for mobile ad hoc networks. The layered security approach is described 
and design criteria for creating secure ad hoc network using multiple authentication 
protocols are analysed. The performance of several such known protocols, which are 
based on challenge-response techniques, is presented through simulation results.     
 
Keywords: authentication, layered security approach, mobile ad hoc networks, 
authentication protocols, challenge-response techniques. 
 
1. Introduction 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of wireless mobile nodes 
dynamically forming a temporary network without any existing network infrastructure 
or centralized administration. Unlike networks using dedicated nodes to support basic 
functions like packet forwarding, routing, and network management, in ad-hoc networks 
these functions are carried out by all available nodes [9, 16, 22]. MANET provide an 
emerging technology for civilian and military applications. However, security in 
MANET is hard to achieve due to the vulnerability of the link, the limited physical 
protection of the nodes, and the absence of a certification authority or centralized 
management point. 
 
The existing security proposals in ad hoc networks are typically attack-oriented  [17, 22] 
since they first identify several security threats and then enhance the existing protocol or 
propose a new protocol to challenge such threats. Because the solutions are designed 
explicitly with certain attack models in mind, they work well in the presence of 
designated attacks but may collapse under new attacks.  
 
When the security of a given network architecture is not properly designed from the 
beginning, then the security goals (i.e. authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, 
availability) are difficult to achieve during network deployment. It is essential, 
therefore, to design secure ad hoc networks that will result in multiple lines of defence 
against both known and unknown security threats. This design is what we have called 
layered security design in [8].  
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In the layered security design presented in [8], we take into consideration not only 
malicious attacks but also other network faults due to misconfiguration, extreme 
network overload, or operational failures. All such faults, whether caused by attacks or 
by misconfiguration, share some symptoms from both the network and the end-user 
perspectives, and should be handled by appropriate security mechanisms. In addition, 
the overall system has to be robust and it should not be critically affected by the 
breakdown of any individual line of defence. 
 
Authentication can be considered as one of the most important primitives in an ad hoc 
network. Due to the nature of ad hoc networks and based on the proposed layered 
security approach, several questions arise. How authentication can be established 
between neighbouring nodes? Which current authentication protocols are applicable to 
ad hoc networks? What cryptographic techniques are suitable for such networks? In this 
article, we seek to identify the security issues related to authentication and also examine 
the adaptation of challenge-response cryptographic protocols, which are based on 
symmetric and asymmetric techniques, in a layered security approach. The node 
authentication methodology implements multiple lines of defence against malicious 
attacks through the layered approach and is presented with simulation results.  
 
In particular, Section 2 presents related works with emphasis in authentication 
mechanisms. Section 3 briefly discusses the main operations related to ad hoc 
networking in the data link and network layers as defined in [8]. Section 4, analyses 
how authentication can be achieved in a layered approach through well known 
cryptographic protocols that use symmetric and asymmetric techniques. The operation 
of well known challenge-response protocols, such as the ISO/IEC 9798-2, 4 and 
Needham-Schoeder, in a MANET environment is also discussed in detail. Section 5 
presents a timing analysis of several challenge-response protocols in order to compare 
the execution time for one-hop multiple authentications. Section 6 concludes with 
remarks and comments on the open security issue in MANET. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Security is an issue that it is more sensitive in MANET than in other networks, due to 
the open nature and lack of infrastructure of ad hoc networks. Current research efforts in 
ad hoc networks follow a hierarchical approach, with the most explored area being that 
of secure routing protocols. Authentication on the other side, has been explored less 
than routing protocols. Despite of that several authentication mechanisms for ad-hoc 
wireless networks have already been proposed. Zhou and Hass [24] identified the 
vulnerability of using a centralized certification authority (CA) for authentication in ad-
hoc networks and proposed a method with multiple CAs based on Threshold 
Cryptography [13]. These multiple CAs have secret shares of a Certificate Authority 
Signing Key (CASK) while there are no CAs that individually know the whole 
complete CASK, which can be known only when more than m CAs collaborate. 
Therefore, this method can support the network security against up to m−1 collaborative 
compromised nodes. While Zhou and Hass’s method improves the robustness of the 
authentication system, it depends on the offline authority which elects n CAs (n ≥ m) 
during the bootstrapping phase. Furthermore, it has poor availability because if n−m+1 
CAs have been compromised, the uncompromised m−1 CAs that are left can’t provide 
authentication services anymore. 
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Kong and et. al. [9] proposed another authentication method based on threshold secret 
sharing [24]. After the bootstrapping phase, a new node can join the network at any time 
through self-initialization it can obtain its own secret share of CASK with the help of m 
local neighbour nodes. Even though this approach enhances scalability and availability, 
it still depends on an offline authority during the bootstrapping phase. In addition, 
Capkun and et. al [4] proposed an authentication method and asserted that mobility 
helps the security. The key idea is that if two nodes are in the vicinity of each other, 
they can establish a security association (SA) by exchanging appropriate cryptographic 
material through a secure channel with a short transmission range. However, this direct 
solution takes a long time because it requires a node to encounter every node that it 
wants to communicate with. 
 
Some of the proposals related to the authenticity of ad hoc networks are based on 
anonymity schemes. Anonymity schemes in mobile ad hoc networks were proposed in 
[23], [2], and [10]. ANODR [10] is based on an on-demand with identity free routing 
protocol using a symmetric cryptography with a ‘trapdoor boomerang onion’ (TBO) 
approach, similar to onion routing [18] used by Chaum in [3]. The trapdoor mechanism 
consists of sending cryptographically secured messages which may be opened only by 
the intended party. In [10] the low performance in highly mobile networks was pointed 
out.  
 
In the MASK [23] protocol a proactive and a reactive approach are applied 
simultaneously. A priori anonymous links are established with all neighbouring nodes 
using a symmetric cryptography and trusted authority. The path discovery process is 
conducted in an on-demand manner and mutually authenticated nodes participate in the 
end-to-end communication. Already established paths may consist of several multipath 
channels however the source and destination nodes become unauthenticated. In SDAR 
[2] the communication between the source and the destination is based on a public key 
cryptography. Additionally, the destination node shares a symmetric session key with 
each intermediate node and uses them to secure discovery path process. This protocol 
takes advantage of both onion and on demand routing. Messages in SDAR are large and 
strongly depend on the number of hops. Nevertheless, SDAR is the first anonymous 
protocol for mobile ad hoc networks that introduces a trust management system. 
However, this system supports only three levels of permissible reputation limiting 
therefore its efficiency. 
 
 
3. Layered Security Design 
    
In [8], we proposed a layered security design that uses multiple lines of defence to 
protect MANET against attacks and network faults. The idea is based on the security 
challenges that arise in the main operations related to ad hoc networking that are found 
in data link and network layers of the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model 
(OSI). In the case of MANET, for example, there are trusted and non-trusted 
environments [15, 16]. In a trusted environment the nodes of the ad hoc network are 
controlled by a third party and can thus be trusted based on authentication. Data link 
layer security is justified in this case by the need to establish a trusted infrastructure 
based on logical security means. If the integrity of higher layer functions implemented 
by the trusted nodes can be assured, then the data link layer security can even meet the 
security requirements raised by higher layers including routing and application 
protocols.  
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In non-trusted environments, on the other hand, trust in higher layers like routing or 
application protocols cannot be based on data link layer security mechanisms. The only 
relevant use of the latter appears to be node-to-node authentication and data integrity as 
required by the routing layer. Moreover, the main constraint in the deployment of 
existing data link layer security solutions (i.e. 802.11 and Bluetooth) is the lack of 
support for automated key management which is mandatory in open environments 
where manual key installation is not suitable. 
 
As mentioned above, the security challenges that arise in the main operations related to 
ad hoc networking are found in the data link and network layers of the OSI. The data 
link layer is the second level of the seven-level OSI model and it is the layer of the 
model which ensures that data is transferred correctly between adjacent network nodes. 
The data link layer provides the functional and procedural means to transfer data 
between network entities and to detect and possibly correct errors that may occur in the 
physical layer. However, the main link layer operations related to ad hoc networking are 
one hop connectivity and frame transmission [13, 24]. Data link layer protocols 
maintain connectivity between neighbouring nodes and ensure the correctness of frames 
transferred. 
The network layer, which is the third level of the seven level OSI model, addresses 
messages and translates logical addresses and names into physical addresses. It also 
determines the route from the source to the destination computer and manages traffic 
problems, such as switching, routing, and controlling the congestion of data packets. 
The main network operations related to ad hoc networking are routing and data packet 
forwarding [14, 15, 16]. The routing protocols exchange routing data between nodes 
and maintain routing states at each node accordingly. Based on the routing states, data 
packets are forwarded by intermediate nodes along an established route to the 
destination. 
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Figure 1 – Protocol Security Process [8] 
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As illustrated in Figure 1, these operations are comprised of link security and network 
security mechanisms that integrate a protocol to achieve protocol security process which 
consists of pre-secure and post-secure sessions. The pre-secure session attempts to 
detect security threats through various cryptographic techniques, whereas the post-
secure session seeks to prevent such threats and react accordingly. In addition, the 
layered security mechanisms include prevention, detection and reaction operations to 
prevent intruders from entering the network. They discover the intrusions and take 
actions to prevent persistent adverse effects. The prevention process can be embedded 
in secure routing and packet forwarding protocols to prevent the attacker from installing 
incorrect routing states at nodes.  
 
The detection process exploits ongoing attacks through identification of abnormal 
behaviour by malicious or selfish nodes. Such misbehaviour can be detected in the pre-
secure session either by node-to-node authentication or by node availability mechanisms 
as illustrated in Figure 1. Once the attacker is detected, reaction operations reconfigure 
routing and packet forwarding operations. These adjustments can range from avoiding 
this particular node during the route selection process to expelling the node from the 
network. Independently from the detection, prevention and reaction, both secure 
sessions can enhance the authentication procedures for node identification in a MANET. 
  
4. Authentication in a Layered Security Approach 
 
As mentioned in section 3, link layer operations involve one-hop connectivity and frame 
transmission, whereas network layer operations include routing and data packet 
forwarding. These operations are comprised of the link and the network security 
mechanisms that can integrate a node authentication approach consisting of two phases. 
The operations of either the link or the network layer can enable one of the two phases 
to take place. In phase-one, for example, the node authentication procedure attempts to 
determine the true identity of the communicating nodes through challenge-response 
protocols based on symmetric-key techniques. Likewise, in phase-two the 
authentication procedure seeks again the identities of the communicating nodes through 
challenge-response protocols based on public key techniques.  
 
It is essential to mention that there are several authentication protocols available in the 
literature [9, 24, 13] that can be applied to MANETs. However, it is necessary to use 
low complexity protocols that will not create extra computational overhead in the 
wireless network. For example, the idea of cryptographic challenge-response protocols 
is that one entity (the claimant node in MANET context) “proves” its identity to the 
neighbouring node by demonstrating knowledge of a secret known to be associated with 
that node, without revealing the secret itself to the verifying node during the protocol. In 
some mechanisms, the secret is known to the verifying node, and is used to verify the 
response; in others, the secret need not actually be known to the verifying node. 
 
In the first phase, the node identification procedure assumes that the secret is known to 
the verifying node, and this secret is used to verify the response with symmetric 
techniques. In the second phase of the authentication, the secret is not actually known to 
the verifying node. Asymmetric techniques can be applied before private information is 
exchanged between communicating nodes. 
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4.1. First Phase 
The node authentication in the layered security design adopts cryptographic methods to 
offer multiple protection lines to communicating nodes. When one or more nodes are 
connected to a MANET, the first phase of the node-to-node authentication procedure 
takes place. At this early stage, it is necessary to be able to determine the true identity of 
the nodes which could possibly gain access to a secret key later on. Let us consider the 
MANET of Figure 2 with the authenticated nodes A, B, and C. 
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Figure 2 – Addition of New Nodes in a MANET 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2a, when node X1 enters the MANET, it will be authenticated 
by both nodes that will exchange routing information later on in the second phase (i.e. B 
and C). When two nodes e.g. X1 and X2 enter the MANET simultaneously (Figure 2b), 
they will both be authenticated by valid nodes. Even though we refer to nodes entering 
simultaneously there will always be a small time difference in their entrance to the 
network. When X1 enters slightly before X2, then X1 gets authenticated first by nodes 
B and C, making X1 a valid node and then X2 gets authenticated by nodes B and X1. 
 
When two or more nodes are simultaneously connected to a MANET (e.g. Figure 2b) 
there will still be a fraction of time that X1, for example, will enter the network first and 
will be authenticated. Once X1 and X2 have been authenticated by valid nodes, they 
will also authenticate each other since routing and packet forwarding data will be sent to 
or received by them. While nodes in the source to destination path are authenticated, 
they can also agree on a secret key, which will be used to encrypt their traffic. When 
symmetric techniques are applied the mutual authentication between B and X1 can be 
achieved based on ISO/IEC 9798-2 [13]: 
 
B ← X1: 1r    (M1) 
B → X1: ),,( 21 BrrEk   (M2) 
B ← X1: ),( 12 rrEk   (M3) 
 
where E is a symmetric encryption algorithm and 1r  and 2r  are random numbers.   
 
Node X1 generates a random number and sends it to B. Upon reception of (M1), B 
encrypts the two random numbers and its identity and sends message (M2) to X1. Next, 
X1 checks for its random number and then constructs (M3) and sends it to B. Upon 
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reception of (M3), B checks that both random numbers match those used earlier. The 
encryption algorithm in the above mechanism may be replaced by a message 
authentication code (MAC), which is efficient and affordable for low-end devices, such 
as sensor nodes. However, MAC can be verified only by the intended receiving node, 
making it ineligible for broadcast message authentication. 
 
The revised three-pass challenge-response mechanism based on a MAC hk that provides 
mutual authentication is ISO/IEC 9798-4 [13], also called SKID3, and has the following 
messages: 
 
B ← X1: 1r    (M1) 
B → X1: )1,,(, 212 Xrrhr k  (M2) 
B ← X1: ),,( 12 Brrhk   (M3) 
 
4.2. Second Phase 
When routing information is ready to be transferred, the second phase of the node 
authentication takes place. Authentication carries on in the available nodes starting with 
one-hop at a time from the source to destination route one-hop at a time. While nodes in 
the source to destination path are authenticated, they can also agree on a secret key, 
which will be used to encrypt their traffic. When asymmetric key techniques are 
applied, nodes own a key pair and the mutual authentication between X1 and C (Figure 
2a) can be achieved by using the modified Needham-Schoeder public key protocol [13] 
in the following way: 
 
X1 → C: )1,( 1 XrPC   (M1) 
X1 ← C: ),( 211 rrPX   (M2) 
X1 → C: 2r    (M3) 
 
where P is a public key encryption algorithm and 1r , 2r  are random numbers.   
 
X1 and C exchange random numbers in messages (M1) and (M2) that are encrypted 
with their public keys. Upon decrypting messages (M1) and (M2), C and X1 achieve 
mutual authentication by checking that the random numbers recovered agree with the 
ones sent in messages (M3) and (M2) respectively. Note that the public key encryption 
algorithm can be replaced by the Menezes-Vanstone elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) 
[13] or by digital signatures. Digital signatures, however, involve much more 
computational overhead in signing, decrypting, verifying and encrypting operations. 
They are less resilient against denial of service attacks since an attacker may launch a 
large number of bogus signatures to exhaust the victim’s computational resources for 
verifying them. Each node also needs to keep a certificate revocation list or revoked 
certificates and public keys of valid nodes. 
 
5. Implementation Results   
The authentication solution in a layered security approach poses grand yet exciting 
research challenges. Since a mobile communication system expects a best effort 
performance from each component, MANET have to properly select authentication 
mechanisms for their nodes that fit well into their own available resources. It is 
necessary to identify the systems principles of how to build such link and network 
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security mechanisms that will explore their methods and learn to prevent and react to 
threats accordingly. 
 
The analysis presented in this section targets to compare the execution time of well 
known authentication protocols when applied in a layered security approach. The 
described protocols in sections 4.1 and 4.2 were simulated following the MANET 
infrastructure of Figure 2a. The implementation results are not affected by the network 
infrastructure. If the infrastructure changes and a new-entered node must be 
authenticated by more or less neighbouring nodes the authentication time will remain 
the same. This is due to the fact that the timing analysis presented in the next few 
paragraphs involves each node individually.  
 
The challenge-response authentication protocols were simulated in an OPNET network 
simulator, whereas the encryption algorithms were implemented in a digital signal 
processor (DSP). The testbed consisted of an IBM compatible PC, in which OPNET 
was installed, and two parallel 36303 Motorola DSPs (66MHz), in which encryption 
and decryption were performed.  
 
Symmetric, asymmetric and elliptic curve cryptosystems were implemented to offer a 
complete analysis of the authentication protocols of sections 4.1 and 4.2. The advanced 
encryption standard (AES) and message digest version 5 as MAC (MD5-MAC) were 
implemented as symmetric algorithms and RSA, and Menezes-Vanstone cryptosystems 
were used as asymmetric key algorithms. The key size was based on X9.30 standard 
specifications.  
 
 
Cryptographic 
Algorithms 
Key  
Length 
Encryption 
(500-bit) 
Decryption 
(500-bit) 
AES 128-bit  20ms 23ms 
MD5-MAC 128-bit 10ms 10ms 
RSA (with CRT) 2048-bit 50ms 120ms  
ECC Menezes-Vanstone 224-bit 72ms 68ms 
 
Table 1 – Timing Analysis of Encryption Algorithms for Specific Key Size 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 1 and as specified in the current draft of the revision of X9.30, 
for reasonable secure 128-bit AES / MD5-MAC, 2048 bits and 224 bits are the 
“appropriate” key sizes for RSA, when the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is used, 
and for ECC, respectively [13, 19, 20]. Note that in the results of Table 1, the AES key 
setup routine is slower for decryption than for encryption; for RSA encryption, we 
assume the use of a public exponent e = 65537, while ECC uses an optimal normal base 
curve [13, 19].   
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Two-Phase Authentication First Phase Second Phase Total Remarks 
2 x ISO/IEC 9798-4 (MD5-MAC) 
(Section 4.1) 
(9798-4 MD5-MAC) 
20.14 ± 2ms 
(9798-4 MD5-MAC) 
20.14 ± 2ms  40.18 ± 5ms NR 
2 x ISO/IEC 9798-2 (AES) 
(Section 4.1) 
(9798-2-AES) 
43.22 ± 2ms 
(9798-2-AES) 
43.22 ± 2ms 86.44 ± 5ms NR 
2 x Needham-Schroeder  
(NS-RSA) (Section 4.2) 
(NS-RSA) 
170.14 ± 2ms 
(NS-RSA) 
170.14 ± 3ms 340.28 ± 5ms NR 
2 x Needham-Schroeder  
(NS-ECC) (Section 4.2) 
(NS-ECC) 
145.17 ± 3ms 
(NS-ECC) 
145.17 ± 2ms 290.34 ± 5ms NR 
9798-4-MD5-MAC & NS-RSA (9798-4-MD5-MAC)  20.14 ± 2ms 
(NS-RSA) 
170.14 ± 2ms 190.28 ± 5ms R* 
9798-2-AES & NS-RSA (9798-2-AES)  43.22 ± 2ms 
(NS-RSA) 
170.14 ± 2ms 213.36 ± 5ms R* 
9798-4-MD5-MAC & NS-ECC (9798-4-MD5-MAC)  20.14 ± 2ms 
(NS-ECC) 
145.17 ± 2ms 165.31 ± 5ms R* 
9798-2-AES & NS-ECC (9798-2-AES) 43.22 ± 2ms 
(NS-ECC) 
145.17 ± 2ms 188.39 ± 5ms R* 
 
Table 2 – Timing Analysis of Authentication in a Layered Approach 
 
Table 2 shows the time that is required for a node to be authenticated, when a 
combination of cryptographic protocols is used in the first and second phase. For 
example, when a node enters a MANET, it can be authenticated by a challenge-response 
protocol (9798-2- or 9798-4) similar to the ones presented in section 4.1. It is not 
recommended, however, for nodes to follow exactly the same authentication procedure 
in phase two when routing information is ready to be transferred. This is because the 
authentication procedure that was successful once is most likely to succeed again 
without increasing security.  
 
Notice that when exactly the same authentication procedure is deployed in both phases, 
the total execution time is faster for the symmetric algorithms (i.e. 40.18ms, 86.44ms, 
and slower for the asymmetric algorithms (i.e. 340.28ms and 290.34ms) than the 
execution time of combined cryptographic techniques (i.e. 190.28ms, 213.36ms, 
165.31ms and 188.39ms). Considering that the authentication procedure that was 
successful once is most likely to succeed again without increasing security, a 
combination of symmetric and asymmetric challenge-response authentication 
techniques appears to be a recommended (R)* option when link and network layers 
operations are taking place. In such circumstances, the decision of whether to use 
challenge-response with symmetric or asymmetric key techniques can be determined by 
timing analysis and therefore node resources.  
 
In our analysis, no consideration was taken when multiple hops were required to 
authenticate nodes in different network topologies of the second phase. In such 
circumstance, it is believed that the multiple authentication will not substantially be 
affected since only will only be authenticated the end-nodes. Moreover, no 
consideration was taken regarding the physical connection link between DSPs and the 
PC in the total timing and it is expected that a different implementation will yield 
different absolute results but the same comparative discussion. In addition, the 
challenge-response total execution time was considered for one-hop connectivity. In the 
case of broadcast messaging, packets were dropped by the neighboring nodes in a table-
driven routing protocol without affecting the execution time of the authentication 
procedure. Moreover, no timing differences were observed in different network loads. 
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The analysis presented in Table 2 evaluates multiple authentication fences in MANET 
and offers new application opportunities. The effectiveness of each authentication 
operation and the minimal number of fences the system has to pose to ensure some 
degree of security assurance was evaluated through simulations analysis and 
measurement in principle. Even though the results of this section were obtained for 
specific challenge-response protocols useful information can be drawn. MANET 
security designers are able to determine whether to use multiple authentication 
techniques or not. They can also decide which combination of challenge-response 
technique to apply in their applications.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Since mobile ad hoc networks can be formed, merged together or partitioned into 
separate networks on the fly, security becomes more sophisticated. Security 
requirements, such as authenticity should focus on the operations of both link and 
network layers. In this article, we explored integrated cryptographic mechanisms in the 
first and second phase that helped to design multiple lines of authentication defense and 
further protect ad hoc networks against malicious attacks. 
 
Designing cryptographic mechanisms such as challenge-response protocols, which are 
efficient in the sense of both computational and message overhead, is the main research 
objective in the area of authentication and key management for ad hoc networks. For 
instance in wireless sensing, designing efficient cryptographic mechanisms for 
authentication and key management in broadcast and multicast scenarios may pose a 
challenge. The execution time of specific protocols was examined and useful results 
were obtained when multiple authentication protocols were applied. This work can be 
extended to provide authentication for nodes that are several hops away and to compare 
routing protocols to different authentication mechanisms. Furthermore, it will be 
interesting to determine how multiple authentication protocols will behave in 
broadcasting and multicasting scenarios.    
 
Eventually, once the authentication and key management infrastructure is in place, data 
confidentiality and integrity issues can be tackled by using existing and efficient 
symmetric algorithms since there is no need to develop any special integrity and 
encryption algorithms for ad hoc networks.    
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